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Abstract: In recent years it is estimated that at least 700 men and 50-60 women have travelled to 
Syria from the UK alone to join IS/ Daesh.  This article focuses on young women and schoolgirls who 
have left their families to join IS. It explores the role of cyberspace in their recruitment and examines 
their likely motivation for involvement in terrorist activities. It sets out the burgeoning of counter- 
terrorist strategies within criminal law to prevent and to punish and explores the contrasting protective 
approach of the family courts. 
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1. YOUNG WOMEN, SCHOOLGIRLS AND IS/DAESH  
Evidence submitted to the UK Home Affairs Select Committee on Countering Extremism (19th 
January 2016) estimated that between 700 and 800 people have travelled from Britain to Syria to join 
IS/Daesh. Of those, the British Home Secretary, in a statement on Counter Terrorism on January 5th 
2016, referring to Metropolitan Police statistics, said about half had returned.  It is estimated that of 
those travelling to Syria, 50-60 are young women and teenage schoolgirls. It is widely accepted that 
these young women are “recruited” and “cyber-groomed” online via social media (Hoyle, Bradford & 
Frenett 2015). Whilst the UK’s much contested and debated ‘Prevent’ agenda (see Coppock 2014, 
Edwards 2016)  (the subject of objection by University lecturers because of its challenge to freedom 
of speech and its essentialist vilification of Muslims and the subject of a unanimous vote against the 
strategy by the National Union of Teachers at its conference on March  28th 2016) has focused on 
mosques, schools, universities and other public spaces as key venues of potential recruitment it is 
evident that it is within the private spaces of the study and the bedroom, the park, the street or theatre 
etc., and in any internet geolocation, that cyber-grooming takes place. Yusra Hussien, (15 years of 
age) from Bristol, was reported to have travelled to Syria to marry and become a “Jihadi bride” was 
thought to have been recruited via the internet. Aqsa Mahmood, aged 20, from Glasgow, was reported 
to have encouraged terrorist acts via social media using the pseudonym “Umm Layth” and was also 
thought to have been recruited via the internet. Salma and Zahra Halane, both 16 years of age, left 
their home in Manchester in 2014, and were said to have sent messages home to their families 
encouraging them to join IS. More recently, in 2015, Shamima Begum 15 years of age, Amira Abase 
  
and Kadiza Sultana (the “Bethnal Green Academy schoolgirls”) left their London homes to join 
IS.Two of them are said to have entered into marriages arranged by IS. It has been reported that 
Amira Abase married an Australian “jihadi” who was killed fighting for IS and that Kadiza Sultana 
also married and her husband has also died. It is believed that cyberspace was used to contact and 
recruit them. Contrary to the promulgated view that has so exercised the public imagination that such 
recruitment happens within Muslim communities and places where they gather, which has authorised 
the over policing and over surveillance of these communities (see Fussey 2013), the communication 
and grooming is happening in secret online. 
 The use of young women by terrorist groups was the subject of investigation by the Home 
Affairs Select Committee on Counter Terrorism on January 28th 2014, but at that time the 
involvement of young women was still viewed with some scepticism.  Paul Flynn MP., a member of 
the Committee, put the following question to Gilles de Kerchove, EU Counterterrorism Coordinator, 
“On the 16th of this month, two women were arrested carrying a large sum of money to Syria. Is this, 
again, another trend that is obvious throughout Europe—of women being used as couriers for large 
sums of money? Gilles de Kerchove replied: “I had not heard many cases of that sort, but that is 
probably the first time we have seen that women are going to Syria” (Question 515). Arguably it is the 
gendered presumption of women’s unlikely involvement in terrorist activity that no doubt contributed 
to the police failings to apprehend, intercept and return the “Bethnal Green Academy schoolgirls” 
notwithstanding that their families had reported the disappearance of these school girls who were 
legally “minors” immediately to the police. Significantly, two of the three girls were only 15 years of 
age, the oldest being only 16 years old (see Edwards 2015). The schoolgirls were observed at the 
border control and observed on CCTV standing in a bus station in Turkey for many hours before 
travelling on to Syria. These and other police failings were the subject of investigation by the Home 
Affairs Committee on 10th March 2015. (Home Affairs Committee, 10th March 2015 oral evidence). 
Certainly by 2015, the evidence of young women leaving the UK to join IS was incontrovertible.  
However the mere leaving the UK to travel to Syria was not criminalised until the Counter Terrorism 
and Security Act 2015 came into force in July 2015, this was after the young women mentioned above 
had left for Syria. 
 
By 2015, a number of women were being prosecuted in the UK for using social media as a 
“tool for terrorism.” For example in Runa Khan pleaded guilty in December 2014 to four offences 
under the Terrorism Act 2006 ss. 2, 3 which prohibits “dissemination” over the internet of material 
likely to be useful in terrorist activity. She had posted on Facebook an article entitled “Raising 
Mujahid Children”, and used “What’s App,” messaging her desire to travel to Syria. She was 
sentenced to five years imprisonment. On March 27th 2015, Hana Khan was found guilty of funding 
terrorism (Terrorism Act 2000 s. 15).  She had sent a man one thousand pounds, he had duped her into 
believing was her boyfriend 2015. Tareena Shakil travelled to Syria with her 14 month old son to join 
IS and posted pictures of him on social media wearing an IS balaclava. In 2015, she returned to the 
UK. She was convicted of “encouraging acts of terrorism” (Terrorism Act 2006 s. 1) and being a 
member of IS, a “proscribed organization” (Terrorism Act 2000 s. 11). Her counsel, Tim Moloney 
QC, said she had developed friendships online after her marriage failed and that she was “groomed” 
by IS members. Evidence from her friends was adduced as to her character. They described her as an 
ordinary young woman, who was “fun loving” and who liked “the Spice Girls”. She was sentenced to 
a term of six years imprisonment on February 1st 2016. In addition to young single women leaving to 
join IS, in 2015, three families left the UK for Syria to join IS. Muhammed Abdul Mannan and his 
extended family; Farzana Ameen and her husband Imran and five children, and a third family headed 
by three sisters the Dawood sisters (left for Syria with their nine children. These families have not 
been intercepted not have they returned to the UK. 
  
 
Official statistics on the prosecution of suspects for terrorist related offences under the 
Terrorism Act 2000 for the period 2014-2015, record 299 arrests, of which 118 persons were charged 
with an offence, of which 85% were considered to be terrorist related offences. 52 were proceeded 
against, and of these, 42 (81%) were convicted, of whom 27 entered a guilty plea. The most common 
offence charged, is “preparation of terrorist acts” (Terrorism Act 2006 s. 5) This section states,   “(1)A 
person commits an offence if, with the intention of— (a)committing acts of terrorism, or (b)assisting 
another to commit such acts, he engages in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to his 
intention)”. Significantly, the proportion of women arrested for terrorism related offences has 
increased since September 11th 2001 and 12 per cent of offences (in 2014-2015) relate to 35 women 
(Official statistics on the prosecution of suspect terrorist activities and the operation of police powers 
under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation for year ending 31 March 2015). 
 
 2. GROOMING IN CYBER-SPACE FOR TERRORIST RECRUITMENT  
Clive Walker and Maura Conway (2015, p.156), examine the role played by mass communications 
technology in terrorist and extremist movements and identify the several legal measures introduced to 
deal with the use of the internet by extremist groups including the closing down of some online 
websites (p. 157),  the criminalization of  precursor activity as a preventative measure (p. 163), 
countering the ideology of terrorism  through the creation of new crimes (p. 164) and the introduction 
of preventive measures in the “Prevent” policy. The “Prevent” policy places a duty on “responsible 
authorities” on a statutory footing Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 s 26. To have regard to 
the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. Fisher and Prucha (2014) in particular, 
point to the resilient and persistent jihadist presence on Twitter and point to the dedicated “media 
mujahideen.” Dilipraj (2015) also details the several ways in which “jihadist” groups have developed 
a network of Twitter accounts, chat rooms and forums etc. including the use of “You Tube”   which 
continually gives them an ideological presence for jihadist propaganda. Certainly, cyber-space has 
played a significant role in engaging support and recruitment to Syria including the grooming and 
recruitment of young women to Syria to become “jihadi brides” and to serve in other ways. The 
cyber-space platform is determined and specific and part of an “electronic ribat” (Fisher and Prucha 
2014). 
By 2016, the UK governments’ concern with the potential of cyber-grooming for terrorist 
purposes and its limited understanding of how young people access cyber space resulted in directing 
its maladroit pre-emptive prevention strategy towards Muslim mothers who the government 
positioned as the key gatekeepers in preventing adult and teenage offspring being drawn into 
terrorism. The UK Prime Minister said on BBC Radio 4 on January 16th 2016, “If you're not able to 
speak English, you're not able to integrate, you may find, therefore, that you have challenges 
understanding what your identity is and you could be more susceptible to the extremist message that 
comes from Daesh,” and he went on to say that Muslim mothers unable to read English would be 
unable to “monitor” the behaviour of those in their families for whom they were responsible. This 
underscores a fundamental lack of understanding of how social media is accessed in that private space 
between the internet device and the user. The Home Affairs Select Committee on Countering 
Extremism on 19th January, 2016, questioned David Anderson QC (Independent reviewer of 
terrorism legislation) on this very point. Chairman Mr Keith Vaz asked: “One of the points that the 
Prime Minister made yesterday is that he felt that it was a language problem and that, by giving 
Muslim mothers, in effect, £20 million to teach them how to speak English, this would somehow have 
an effect on stopping people going, because it is the Muslim mothers, in particular, who seem to be 
encouraging people. Do you agree with what the Prime Minister has said? Do you think that that is 
one way of making sure that people are more integrated?” (Question 930). David Anderson QC 
  
replied, “I think it is unfortunate that this whole question of language learning, which is a very 
important part of the integration and empowerment of women, should get mixed up with the business 
of ISIS”. 
 
Few parents, regardless of religion or ethnicity, are able to “police” or exercise this sort of 
control over their teenage sons or daughters.  Michael Ellis, a member of the Home Affairs Select 
Committee (see Home Affairs Committee on Counter Terrorism 2015, 10th March 2015), put a 
question to the father of Amira Abase (one of the “Bethnal Green Academy schoolgirls”) in which he 
indicated his concern and scepticism that the schoolgirls were able to have access to their own 
passports. “The passports are in your possession and control at home and your daughter knew where 
they were…So you are assuming your daughter took the passport without your knowledge”? Mr. 
Abase replied, “Yes, of course, she is trustworthy. They are free.” The reality is that parents have little 
understanding of social media and even less control over their adolescent offspring’s activities in their 
use of cyber-space.  
How should the law should protect young people including young women from IS and the use 
by IS of the internet in recruiting them? The response of the UK government to IS/Daesh’s use of 
cyber-space has been to strengthen existing criminal legislation by the Terrorism Act 2006 to include 
the internet. Section 3(1) (a) specifically prohibits the “encouragement” and dissemination of 
publications for terrorist purposes extending the offence to the internet. “(1) This section applies for 
the purposes of sections 1 and 2 in relation to cases where— (a) a statement is published or caused to 
be published in the course of, or in connection with, the provision or use of a service provided 
electronically; or (b) conduct falling within section 2(2) was in the course of, or in connection with, 
the provision or use of such a service.” But there is even by 2016 still little specific provision for 
terrorist grooming. 
 
i. Grooming young women 
As already pointed out the internet  has been used to target young women and schoolgirls who are 
being groomed online to enlist them in a range of extremist and terrorist activities including leaving 
the UK to join IS (see “Britain’s Jihadi Brides” 2015). The role of young women is hugely important 
to IS as an army of domestic workers who provide all the domestic services needed to support IS. 
Young women also provide the sexual services required by men. Some women are marrying the jihadi 
fighters but it is unlikely even given the tenets of the interpretation of Islam IS states it adheres to that 
women  are providing sexual services within monogamy. Some women are also being used to provide 
sexual services to many men. Thus the sexual abuse of women is operating at two levels first, within 
the context of marriage and second, outside marriage where women are providing a sexual service 
vicariously to several men. There is considerable agreement on this point. Jacoby (2015) argues that, 
“many women have accepted as their duty to contribute to violent Jihad by serving in domesticated 
roles as wives, mothers, caregivers, homemakers, community builders, and symbols of national unity” 
(p.533).  The gender based abduction and tactical use of young school girls by Boko Harem provides 
an insight into the use and abuse of women in this way (Zenn and Pearson 2014). 
Willingness to succumb to a domestic role may well stand in sharp contradistinction to 
women’s role in nationalist struggles and in revolutionary movements. Young women may well see 
themselves in this idealized role. Although it may also be the case that women are prepared to 
sacrifice any gains they can make for women’s equality or for women as a group, to the common 
good of the so called jihad struggle. Research on “British Jihadists: Preventing Travel Abroad and 
Stopping Attacks at Home” conducted by the Henry Jackson Society, September 2014, reveals how 
advice is offered on how to get to Syria, details of the idealized life that awaits young women, and 
  
their role and status as a wife in the Jihad, all of which may be very far removed from the reality that 
they experience on a daily basis. It is not certainly not clear whether these women become involved 
volitionally, it is more likely that they are coerced and compelled.  
 Not surprisingly the legal defence submissions and narratives in the Shakil, Khan, and Khan 
cases (above) present the defendant as a woman under duress, whose will has been overborne or else 
has been duped, tricked and misled. Some women are certainly woefully misled, and jihadists through 
social media are easily reaching schoolgirls and young women through cyber-space. Such women are 
the perfect target since they are   single, unattached, without sexual experience and the ideal woman to 
indoctrinate, and groom to leave their homes to travel to Syria and to join these men with promises of 
status, role, significance and meaningful life in assisting in the creation of IS’s perverted version of an 
Islamic state. As Shakil (above) insisted: “For me, what it was about was living a Muslim life. I just 
wanted to live an Islamic life, not to kill anybody.” The criminal law however does not sufficiently 
capture these new offences of internet grooming for terrorism recruitment. The criminal law however 
does recognise “grooming” in the commission of sexual offences. The Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 
15, criminalises the meeting of a child following sexual grooming, etc., where the child is under 16: 
“Where A has met or communicated with another person (B) on at least one occasion (as amended by 
the Criminal justice and Courts Act 2015 s. 36), and intentionally meets B, or travels with the 
intention of meeting B in any part of the world or arranges to meet B in any part of the world.”  This 
offence was extended to online grooming Serious Crime Act 2015 s. 67 criminalising sexual 
communication with a child. 
ii. Trafficking young women 
These young women who are going to Syria are not only being “groomed,” but they are being 
trafficked and certainly once outside the UK they are being coerced and likely trafficked into sexual 
slavery. There is evidence that young women and men are being trafficked to join IS and also being 
trafficked within IS (cited in Jacoby p.537). “Even when girls join ISIS voluntarily, they may find 
themselves in situations of sexual slavery” (p. 538). The recent introduction of the Modern Slavery 
Act 2015 provides for protection against slavery, servitude and forced labour. It is yet as far as I am 
aware to be interpreted to apply to anyone who has attempted to traffic women to join IS. Section 2 
(1) provides “A person commits an offence if the person arranges or facilitates the travel of another 
person (“V”) with a view to V being exploited.(2) It is irrelevant whether V consents to the travel 
(whether V is an adult or a child).(3)A person may in particular arrange or facilitate V’s travel by 
recruiting V, transporting or transferring V, harbouring or receiving V, or transferring or exchanging 
control over V. (4)A person arranges or facilitates V’s travel with a view to V being exploited only 
if—(a)the person intends to exploit V (in any part of the world) during or after the travel.”  Once 
outside the UK these person are extremely vulnerable as Jacoby points out (p. 538) “…those girls and 
women who already joined are now located in situations of armed conflict, outside the reach of 
international law, without diplomatic support and difficult, if not impossible, to rescue”.  
As for the young girls and young women recruited, groomed and trafficked by IS and those 
subsequently involved in terrorist related activities,  should they be apprehended and intercepted or 
should they return to the UK are any defences available to them? The general defence of duress is 
available but the current criminal law defence is extremely restricted. The House of Lords judgment 
in R v Hasan [2005] reaffirmed the requirement of threat of death or serious injury. In addition it 
reinstated the earlier position that the threat was to be carried out immediately if the defence is to be 
operative. It is unlikely that any woman or young girl groomed or trafficked to join IS could rely on 
this defence since she may not be threatened with immediate death or serious bodily harm. The recent 
addition of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 s. 45, offers a defence akin to duress for those accused of 
trafficking offences where they are indeed themselves the victims of trafficking. So a person is not 
guilty of an offence if compelled and “(c) the compulsion is attributable to slavery or to relevant 
  
exploitation, and (d) a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person’s 
relevant characteristics would have no realistic alternative to doing that act”. Could this provision and 
this defence be used in cases where women are groomed to join IS. First there would need to be a 
change of consciousness whereby those joining IS were perceived as compelled and as victims. After 
all it is only recently that international law recognised that trafficked persons were compelled and 
compelled to engage in criminal offences. We are witnessing the victimization, abduction, 
kidnapping, and grooming of young girls through IS’s use of cyber- space. After all like cyber-crime 
why meet face to face when you can recruit simply through social media and be thousands of miles 
away beyond the reach of the law. These young women are held in sexual slavery. This new slavery is 
presented to them as the professed ‘freedom’ of IS. These women and schoolgirls believe that a life 
with IS/Daesh will offer them freedom, a choice of partners, ideologically supported by a belief that 
they are following their faith and fighting ideologically against a corrupt and colonialist Kufirist West.  
 
3. EXPLAINING FEMALE RECRUITMENT: DOMINANT AND SUBJUGATED 
DISCOURSES 
Repeatedly the seminal question asked, is whether there is anything distinct about the backgrounds, 
psychology, religious commitment of these young women and schoolgirls that can be identified as 
contributing to their “vulnerability” or “susceptibility” for grooming and trafficking by terrorist 
groups. Invariably the answer is “No”.  However, a crisis of identity, a sense of grievance, and 
religious fanaticism have nevertheless been repeatedly identified by the UK government as significant 
factors in their recruitment, and are factors which have informed the UK governments “Prevent” 
strategy and Prevent duty guidance. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-
guidance).  Vulnerability for terrorism is understood by the British government to mean something 
quite specific. “Most significantly, these “vulnerabilities” are closely tied to issues of integration into, 
and social cohesion with, a normalised understanding of British society” (Martin 2014, p.67). The 
Home Office took the view that that communities who cannot or will not participate in all civic 
society “are more likely to be vulnerable to radicalization by all kinds of terrorist groups” (cited in 
Martin 2014, p. 67). Indeed, the UK Prime Minister echoed this when he said that those who are not 
integrated into the British way of life could be more susceptible to the extremist message that comes 
from Daesh. So in this new age there seems little space for recognition of different cultures with 
different identities (the Parekh ideal), the multicultural ideal has indeed become a multicultural 
fallacy.  
In looking to the narratives that are proposed to offer an explanation for those who have been 
recruited into terrorism some narratives have a privileged place whilst others are silenced. Michel 
Foucault in his lecture “Power and Knowledge” (1976, 1980) identifies what he calls subjugated 
knowledge as “…the historical contents that have been buried and disguised in a functionalist 
coherence or formal systemization. By ‘subjugated knowledges’ one should understand something 
else…namely a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to the task or 
insufficiently elaborated;  naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required 
level of cognition or scientificity” (1980 p. 81). But it is not simply that these knowledges have been 
buried by some accident of history, as Althusser (1970) in his analysis of what he calls ideological 
state apparatuses writes, “In other words, the school (but also other State institutions like the Church, 
or other apparatuses like the Army) teaches ‘know-how’, but in forms which ensure subjection to the 
ruling ideology or the mastery of its ‘practice’”. Knowledge that does not does not serve the state 
ideological apparatus or the dominant ruling, economic, intellectual or political force is knowledge or 
ideas that are consciously suppressed and “gulaged”. Foucault as did Althusser also identifies the 
centrality of law in this process, “The system of right, the domain of the law, are permanent agents of 
these relations of domination, these polymorphous techniques of subjugation” (Foucault 1980, p. 96). 
  
This concept of “subjugated knowledge” is useful in examining the silencing and marginalization of 
those explanations of terrorist activities which do not conform to the governmental agenda. There has 
been considerable discussion of the subjugation of alternate knowledges specifically within the field 
of terrorism studies (Jackson 2012) but little attempt to explore how this specifically operates in 
relation to understanding women’s motivation for terrorist involvement. 
 The  dominant  official discourses explaining  young women and schoolgirls  leaving the UK 
to join IS have focused on the pressures of  traditional Muslim family life and the role of religion. The 
gendering of these analyses demonstrates the incredulity and inability to understand how the 
apparently subjugated Muslim female can at the same time become a woman with agency. These 
explanations straddle the binaries of the trope of women being led and controlled on the one hand, or 
else inhabiting some demonic space out with femininity and womanhood on the other. The narratives 
and the understandings of the motives of these young women is very much presented from an 
orientalist perspective either they are vulnerable and victim, or else beyond redemption especially 
when they involve their own children, as in the cases of Shakil and Khan (above). The impact of 
oriental stereotyping imaginings on the shaping of official discourse and media representation is 
prominent in the work of Maryam Khalid (2011) Tami Jacoby (2015) and Kathy Lester and Edna 
Erez (2015). Khalid (2011, p.18) examines the representation of men and women and argues that 
these sexual binaries are highly gendered where gendered orientalism marks “’Other’ women as 
voiceless victims of a barbaric (male)” (p. 16). So that men are represented as “evil” and “barbaric” 
and women as the oppressed victim. Khalid significantly adopts the framework of analysis provided 
by Edward Said’s Orientalism (1979) in her endeavour “to uncover the power relationships that 
underscore the representations of the ‘Other’ in the War on Terror” (p. 15). This has also led to the 
appropriation of the “saving women” of the East crusade rhetoric behind which to hide and veil the 
real motivation which is to conquer and dominate parts of the Middle East and justify military 
intervention. But are women who join IS always the voiceless victims or do they have agency? Laster 
and Erez (2015) certainly think that they have agency and they query how is it that in exceptional 
circumstances patriarchy lets women into what has been typically men’s business. They suggest that 
the representation of women as passive, victims, helpless, maternal etc., actually provides women 
with an advantage (p. 88). This advantage lies in the element of surprise since the stereotypical 
expectation of such women is that they will be subservient and that this ‘reading’ of women may 
determine the onlooker’s response to her. Indeed, Fanon (1965), identified how the French military in 
Algeria ‘read’ the veil as a symbol of subjugation and responded to women accordingly,  yet women 
used the veil imbuing it with a new meaning and with a revolutionary potential as it enabled them to 
conduct  bombing campaigns undetected. Jacoby (2015) is not persuaded that such women have been 
able to free themselves from a subservient gendered life. She suggests that women “have accepted as 
their duty to contribute to violent jihad by serving domesticated roles as wives, mothers, caregivers, 
homemakers, community builders, and symbols of national unity” (p.533). Jacoby identifies their role 
as part of “state building” and IS’s manifesto for recruiting women   bear and give birth to the future 
Caliphate (p. 535). Mia Bloom’ (2011a) echoes this state building agenda in that women are seen as 
little more than ‘baby factories’ in the desire to populate the new ‘purist’ Islamic state. Certainly some 
women have positioned themselves or been positioned by IS as “mothers” in this quest. Aqsa 
Mahmood otherwise reportedly known as “Umm Layth” (Mother of Layth), is reported to have 
written on a twitter account in her name, “We are created to be mothers and wives - as much as the 
western society has warped your views on this with a hidden feminist mentality.”  Zine (2006) is right 
when she argues that women are caught somewhere between orientalism and fundamentalism. 
 
Dominant Discourses 
i. Conservative families -subjugated lives 
  
The too conservative Muslim family has been suggested as one of the reasons that propel women into 
joining IS or else make them more vulnerable to its influence. Of those women who left for Syria did 
they come from families with proscribed and fixed gender roles? Were women’s life chances 
restricted by culture and custom? Were their educational, career and employment prospects, social 
and family opportunities limited? Is it the case that arranged marriage would have been the norm and 
expectation? Indeed, there is some academic support for this perception. Jacoby (2015, p.538) suggest 
that “a Muslim girl may envision in ISIS an escape from unbearable social pressures to conform”. 
Bloom has similarly argued that an oppressive culture may be a trigger making her vulnerable (Bloom 
2011a, 2011b). On the arranged marriage question, Sardar (2013) writes: “Arranged marriages work 
in this framework of extended family. They are the heartbeat of Asian tradition”. The harsh reality of 
forced marriage cannot be ignored either.  One thousand forced marriages have been recorded in the 
UK since the introduction of the Anti-Social Behaviour Crime and Policing Act 2014. The Forced 
Marriage Protection Unit reported that 40% of victims were below 18 years of age. Domestic violence 
may also be another factor. Certainly, there is evidence that for some Asian and Muslim women the 
rates of unhappiness in families is high if suicide rates are indeed a measure of unhappiness. For 
example, Southall Black Sisters in their report “Sane and Safe” (see 
http://www.southallblacksisters.org.uk/reports/safe-and-sane-report/) stated that suicide rates among 
British women of Asian origin is twice the national average. Women under 35 were three times more 
likely to kill themselves than other ethnic groups citing domestic violence, abuse and arranged 
marriage as the main causes. Or is this just Orientalism? On the other hand, if some Muslim women 
are under the control of their families how is it that they break free at all? The subjugation of women 
in their own communities, may certainly be a factor in vulnerabilising young women to the draw of a 
life with IS which is portrayed as freedom. But do families that exert control over their children 
produce children who become dissidents or terrorists any more than any other family forms? Or is this 
thinking just essentialism? However it is persuasive that whilst these women may be abandoning their 
families at the same time they do not abandon their culture, or religion but can see themselves as 
contributing pro-actively to what they perceive as a “truly” Islamic movement which is also taking a 
position against Western imperialism.  IS propaganda presents IS to them as an altruistic and noble 
movement. As Shakil (above) said her involvement was just about leading and living what she saw as 
a Muslim life. 
 
ii.  Pathological or ‘nothing exceptional’  
Another enduring dominant explanatory narrative is the belief that the families from which these 
young women and schoolgirls are drawn must in some way be very different from other families. 
These suppositions formed the basis of questions the Home Affairs Committee on Counter Terrorism 
(2015) 10th March 2015, put to Fahmida Aziz, first cousin to Khadija Sultana, and to Sahima Begum 
the sister of Shamima Begum and to  Hussen Abase, father of Amira Abase (the families, of the 
“Bethnal Green Academy” schoolgirls). Yet, in all their answers the families confirmed that neither 
the schoolgirls nor their families were in any way distinct or different. In responding to the question 
from Mr Keith Vaz Chair of the Committee, “Had you any idea that they were being radicalised”? 
Hussen Abase, father of Amira Abase said, “Not at all”. The older sister of Shamima Begum similarly 
responded, “My sister was into everything normal there was nothing to indicate…My sister was into 
any normal teenage things. She used to watch ‘Keeping up with the Kardashians’ and stuff like that.” 
(Question 185). Nor said the witnesses did the school have any indicators.  
Similarly, even where young girls have become involved in “promoting terrorism” there is 
still nothing in their family background to point to anything identifiably different about them or their 
families.  Samina Malik, (R v Malik (Samina Hussain) [2008]), the so called “lyrical terrorist,” (the 
name she gave herself because she wanted to ‘be cool’) was employed as a sales assistant in W.H. 
  
Smith’s newspaper shop at Heathrow airport in London. She wrote so called “poems” on pieces of 
paper and on till receipts and then later posted them on social media. “The desire within me increases 
every day to go for martyrdom, the need to go increases second by second….  Show the children 
videos and pictures of Mujahideen and tell them to become strong”. At her trial the prosecution 
presented her as a “committed Islamic extremist who supports terrorism and terrorists.” In her defence 
she said the poems were meaningless. She was convicted of the offence of “glorifying terrorism” 
(Terrorism Act 2000 s.58) and sentenced to a term of 9 months imprisonment. On appeal against 
conviction (allowed) she said she wanted to “move on with her life” and “become a housewife.” Such 
conservative gendered aspirations for her future life suggested that in fact she was indeed a very 
ordinary girl who wanted to ‘be cool’ and no doubt felt frustrated and trapped in a dead end job as a 
sales assistant. Despite a wealth of evidence which points to there being nothing different about these 
young girls or their families, government policies on counter-terrorism have been directed at the 
control and surveillance of the Muslim community en masse treating them as a “suspect community” 
and stigmatising them. 
iii.  Pathological Muslim men 
The dominant discourse and writings on Muslim men have stigmatised Muslim communities and 
focused on the danger they present and presented Islam in all its representations as fanaticism. The 
ideologies and tropes of Muslim men and Muslim male youth (see Lynch 2013) echo Edward Said’s 
concerns (1997). The Muslim man is,  as Khalid points out, especially at this time “a threat to be 
contained” (Khalid 2011, p. 23).In bolstering and grounding this representation, any male 
transgression  is broadly publicised and used to caricature all Muslim men in general terms. Susan 
Okin’s ‘Is Multi culturalism bad for women?’ (1999) for example, in exploring Islamic community’s 
focuses on the worst instances of patriarchal culture including, honour killing and suggests that 
“extinction” of the culture is the preferred solution. “In the case of a more patriarchal minority 
culture, no argument can be made on the basis of self-respect or freedom that the female members of 
the culture have a clear interest in its preservation. Indeed, they might be much better off if the culture 
into which they were born were either to become extinct (so that its members would become 
integrated into the less sexist surrounding culture) or, preferably, to be encouraged to alter itself so as 
to reinforce the equality of women . . .” (pp. 2,3). Okin is not without her critics. Abu-Lughod (2015) 
makes the point that the iconic use of honour crime as an exemplar of cultural practices   stigmatises 
not only particular acts of violence but entire communities (Abu-Lughod p. 114). For example, the 
recent representation in UK national public debate which focussed on a group of men in Bradford, 
England (who happened to be of Pakistani descent) and were responsible for the trafficking of young 
girls provides just one example of this essentializing. Jack Straw, MP. saw this trafficking of young 
girls by Pakistani men as a “suspect community” problem. Stigmatizing the entire Pakistani 
community he said in 2011, “But there is a specific problem which involves Pakistani heritage men ... 
who target vulnerable young white girls. …We need to get the Pakistani community to think much 
more clearly about why this is going on and to be more open about the problems that are leading to a 
number of Pakistani heritage men thinking it is OK to target white girls in this way”. Attempts to 
explain this problem have theorised this behaviour as an inevitable product of a community where 
sexual restrictions are placed on males and females limiting sexual encounters outside marriage 
suggesting that the cultural norms of Muslim communities forces them to prey on young non-Asian 
girls. What impact do these negative representations and the continual production and reproduction of 
these diatribes of hostility and racialized misrepresentation have on the sense of identity and dignity 
of men and of women in these communities? To what extent does the pathologization and 
essentializing of Muslim men in this way affect a collective sense of pride, identity, hurt and anger? 
 
iv.  Devoutness and exposure to radical ideas 
  
Devoutness is of course associated with peacefulness, grace, humility, righteousness, godliness, 
piousness and saintliness and always acting for the good and for the betterment of others. But when 
Islamic devoutness is considered it takes on a new meaning and has become warped by IS. The 
dominant discourse and understanding of devoutness when considered in the Islamic context is that it 
is a standard bearer of violent extremism. The notion that Islamic devoutness is in some way linked to 
radicalization, extremism and terrorism is also ingrained in the public mind. The Home Affairs 
Committee on Counter Terrorism 10th March 2015, explored the question of devoutness when 
questioning the families of the “Bethnal Green Academy schoolgirls”. Michael Ellis, a member of the 
Committee asked, “Were here any indicators that the girls were becoming more devout in thinking. 
Had you noticed any difference”? The families of the schoolgirls resolutely said “No”. Islam, the faith 
per se, is now positioned as the problem and believers in Islam as the enemy. 
 
SUBJUGATED NARRATIVES 
There are of course other reasons that can offer some understanding of why young women are drawn 
towards, drift into, are pulled, or coerced into joining IS, however these alternate understandings are 
subjugated. An analysis of the subjugated explanations  include for example a consideration of inter 
alia, the impact and effect of  the vilification of Muslim identity (see Kundnani 2014), a sense of 
outrage  and frustration, a lack of opportunity and life chances, and a rejection of Western foreign 
policy in the Middle East. Arguably these may also be reasons for the alienation of young people 
which results in them travelling abroad to join IS (see Brown 2014). 
i. A justified sense of outrage  
In this jurisdiction there is a calcified and habituated Islamophobia within domestic policy on crime 
and policing, (see “Operation Champion”) and over surveillance of Muslim communities mentioned 
above, (Fussey 2013) and encroaching and enveloping “governmentality” (see the “Prevent” policy as 
an example of this) I use Foucault’s concept of “governmentality” here whereby he identifies the 
power of the state through ideology, rhetoric and discourse to control and govern. Islamophobia is 
now so constituted in the ideological state apparatus in the Althusserian sense (Althusser 1970) and in 
the public mind that it has become a warped norm, habituated in media reportage, in public policy, in 
Counter Terrorism law, in the justification for suspension of the Human Rights Act 1998, in 
justifications for prohibiting the face veil or niqab, and in the recent refugee rhetoric and policy. It is 
true that the Oriental subject is essentialized, fetishized, demonized and racialized today more than 
Edward Said (1997) could possibly have envisioned when he wrote, “What is said about the Muslim 
mind, or character or religion or culture as a whole cannot now be said in mainstream discussion 
about Africans, Jews, other Orientals or Asians” (1997 p. xii). Said (1997) argued in his book 
Covering Islam that “what the media produce is neither spontaneous nor completely ‘free’: ‘news’ 
does not just happen” (p.48), instead, there is a “qualitative and quantitative tendency to favor certain 
views and certain representations of reality over others” (Said, 1997, p. 49). Young women and girls 
are inevitably affected by these negative representations of Islam and of Muslim men and of Muslim 
women and their families and their communities, racist attacks against their communities and against 
women within them who wear the niqab, (MacKinnon, 2010) and also against women who wear the 
hijab (see Edwards 2012, 2014a, and 2014b). These attacks are also characterized by a general 
ridicule of their faith which is accepted and permitted from the vehement defence of the Danish 
Cartoons to the defence of Charlie Hebdo as the principle of freedom of speech is perverted and those 
who wish to rain down hatred hide behind freedom of speech’s noble claims. Are these subjugated 
narratives reasons for being drawn into terrorism related activities? 
 
ii. Western Foreign policy and domestic policy 
  
In a society where foreign policy interventions into Middle Eastern Muslim countries have included 
the killing of innocent civilians, and where they bear responsibility for the shamefulness of Abu 
Ghraib (Eisenman 2007) and complicity in the  torture of  terror suspects in Guantanamo Bay (Luban 
2007), there is a justified  outrage. A growing sense of despair arising from Western incursions into 
the Middle East may provide another reason for the alienation for many including Muslims who turn 
to IS. The role played by Western foreign policy in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and the Middle East in 
alienating and antagonising and stressing young people has not been mooted in UK government 
dialogue as a possible causes of terrorist activity or of “radicalization”. The Home Affairs Committee 
inquiry into “Countering Extremism” has not included in its questioning of witnesses in any real way 
any consideration of whether Western foreign policy might have contributed. However, Paul Flynn 
MP did perhaps exceptionally pose one such question when questioning Gilles de Kerchove (Question 
545) at the Home Affairs Select Committee on Countering Extremism on 28th January 2014.  
“Do your responsibilities and the responsibilities of the United Nations include the job of trying to 
build confidence and counteract this gulf of suspicion between the Western Christian world and the 
Eastern Muslim world, which is probably fuelled by the imbalance and the asymmetry of the weapons 
that they each have? Do you think that the use of drones – hugely sophisticated weapons that cannot 
be matched by the other side – is itself a cause of increasing terrorism, because terrorists, and those in 
that position, potential terrorists, feel themselves impotent to defend themselves and their 
communities against drones and other sophisticated equipment?” 
Significantly, Eland (1998) was one of the early voices asking the question whether foreign policy 
itself breeds terrorism. 
Historically however those who question the role of Western foreign policy in the Middle East and 
suggest that the West shares some culpability, have been silenced or else severely admonished. For 
example, Baroness Jenni Tonge, former Liberal Democrat MEP, when talking on the plight of the 
Palestinians in 2004, at a Palestine Solidarity Campaign meeting, said that if she was a Palestinian, 
she would consider becoming a suicide bomber herself. “If I had to live in that situation - and I say 
that advisedly - I might just consider becoming one myself.”  She was trying to understand despair 
and a desire to self-immolate, obliterate and die in this way. She was asked to apologise and 
eventually was forced to resign as a Liberal Democratic MP. Cherie Blair QC., the wife of the UK 
Prime Minister said of the Palestinians in 2002: “As long as young people feel they have got no hope 
but to blow themselves up you are never going to make progress.” The office of the Prime Minister 
apologized immediately. More recently, The Home Affairs Committee on  Countering Terrorism 
January 19th 2016   in its questioning of Shami Chakrabarti, the Director of Liberty  who is well 
known for her opposition to British and Western  foreign policy  and  for her staunch defence of 
human rights and liberty was  subjected to a quite shameful, disgraceful and hostile questioning. Was 
this hostility and anger towards her and attempt to silence because she dared to provide a counter-
narrative in critiquing the UK government’s counter-terrorism policy?  She continued to answer 
questions put to her with grace and measure “Look, I don’t know but I think my instinct is—and this 
is just my life experience of having travelled up and down this land and been the daughter of migrants 
and met a lot of people, privileged people and vulnerable people—that there is a language problem 
with radicalisation, but it is the language of hate rather than the language of human rights”. Western 
foreign policy and the silencing and minimalization of torture atrocities (Foucault’s ‘subjugated 
knowledge’) that have been committed in Guantanamo Bay and in Abu Ghraib and the treatment of 
the Palestinian people (Viterbo 2009)  all contribute to justifiable sense of resentment. David 
Anderson QC, the Independent reviewer of anti-terrorist legislation more recently explained that one 
of the reasons why young people are turning to terrorism, “it could be, one often hears, the foreign 
policy grievance’ (Home Affairs Select Committee 19th January 2016, Question 926).  
iii.  When hate speech hides behind satire 
  
The quite appalling Charlie Hebdo killings in Paris in 2015 seemed in the understandable outrage and 
tragic aftermath to unleash a justification of hate speech, albeit unintended, by describing any verbal 
attack on Muslims however denigrating as a question of satire. Michael Ondaatje and Peter Carey 
were just two of many who were of the opinion that the Charlie Hebdo killings were used to 
legitimate a freedom of speech that permitted Muslim hatred. Carey said, “A hideous crime was 
committed, but was it  a freedom-of-speech  for PEN America to be self-righteous about….All this is  
complicated by PEN’S seeming blindness to the cultural arrogance of the French nation, which does 
not recognize its moral obligation to a large and disempowered segment of their population.” The 
rising Islamophobia hiding behind satire in the US for example  is demonstrated in the organising of 
the  “Draw the Prophet Mohammed” cartoon contest in  Texas, organized by the American Freedom 
Defense Initiative (AFDI) at which Geert Wilders who leads the Dutch right wing “party for 
Freedom” gave a keynote speech, is all too apparent.  
Muslim women share a sense of outrage with regard to the vilification of their communities 
and religion as part of “popular culture.” They have also to contend with the misrepresentations of 
Islamic clothing allegedly satirised by haute couture fashion houses and some so called feminist 
groups either ridiculing their attire or else defining for Muslim women what that liberation should 
look like.FEMEN provides just one example when in 2012 they held what they called a “Topless 
Jihad” are called for ‘Bare breasts against Islamism! Yet they did this baring their breasts whilst 
covering their head in a hijab. This acclaimed and self-professed expression of feminism denigrated 
the hijab in graphically alluding to the sexual oppression of women through nakedness and the 
oppression of Islamic women through coveredness. Implicit in this demonstration was the message 
that removal of ‘her’ Islamic clothing would free her from her oppression and save her (Khalid 2011, 
p. 22).  
This anti-Muslim epidemic has contributed to an increase in physical assaults on Muslims. 
Criminal Statistics England and Wales for 2011/12 and 2012/13 and 2014/15 estimate an average of 
70,000 incidents of religiously motivated hate crime annually with Muslim adults the most likely to 
be a victim of religiously motivated hate crime. In 2012/13, the police recorded 1,573 religious hate 
crimes, around one-quarter (24%) of religious hate crimes were violence against the person. Figures 
for 2015 indicate that the number of race hate crimes has increased by 15 per cent, up 5,464, to 42,930 
offences over the previous year (see also Awan and Zempi 2015). 
 
4. LEGAL RESPONSES IN CRIMINAL AND FAMILY LAW 
The introduction of criminal law measures and the imaginative application of existing family law and 
inherent jurisdiction measures in the UK is a direct response to these images and tropes of those who 
leave for Syria, such that women are perceived either as offenders with agency or as victims who are 
vulnerable and in need of protection. The criminal law measures reflect the tendency to position those 
who leave for Syria including men and women as persons with agency, who are deliberate in their 
planned, intentious acts and who act with volition, such that punishments are harsh with little 
consideration of rehabilitation. The government however attributes the causes of terrorism to 
radicalization, nihilism and religious extremism which becomes the dominant force in driving the 
legal agenda (Jackson 2015, p.14.).The family courts in their dealings with young schoolgirls at least, 
position them quite differently, as without agency, coerced and controlled.  
 
i. Criminal law and prevention and punishment 
As part of the counter-terrorist strategy, the criminal law provisions especially the Counter Terrorism 
and Security Act 2015 has introduced for the first time pre emptive provisions to prevent persons 
  
suspected of going to join IS from doing so.Section 1 and Schedule 1 provides for the seizure of 
passport and travel documents “where a person is suspected of intending to leave Great Britain or the 
United Kingdom in connection with terrorism-related activity.” Here, “Terrorism” and “terrorist” 
have the same meaning as in the Terrorism Act 2000 (ss. 1(1) to (4), 40). “(1) In this Act ‘terrorism’ 
means the use or threat of action where—(a) the action falls within subsection (2), (b) the use or threat 
is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation] or to 
intimidate the public or a section of the public, and(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of 
advancing a political, religious [racial] or ideological cause.” Section 17 provides for travel bans. For 
those who having left wish to return (Shakil above) “temporary exclusion orders” (ss. 2-4), may be 
put in place. However return is permitted only by the Secretary of State (ss. 5-8) and upon return the 
returnee is subject to a Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures notice (TPIM) under the 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 s. 9. These exclusion measures are further 
bolstered by a provision under the Immigration Act 2014 s. 66, which provides for the deprivation of 
citizenship.  
In response to the terror threat the reach of the law has also extended into arenas of social and 
private life through the monitoring, policing and surveillance of “suspect communities”. In analyzing 
this tendency Martin (2014, p.64) develops Foucault’s construct of   “governmentality.”  In the UK, 
the “Prevent” strategy (referred to earlier) is an expression of this “governmentality” setting down in 
law, and mandated by the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015, s. 26, the requirement that all 
“responsible authorities” develop anti radicalization strategies. Section 26 of the Act says specified 
authorities in the exercise of their functions, are to have “due regard to the need to prevent people 
from being drawn into terrorism”. This strategy is being developed in the absence of a definition of 
radicalization or extremism.  The latest prevention efforts for “de radicalization” for those considered 
at risk of terrorist recruitment have been met with criticism and incredulity. The National Police 
Chiefs' Council (NPCC) has recorded that 1,800 children have been referred to the “de radicalization” 
- Channel programme. The “moral panic” over terrorism, the racist assumptions about and  grotesque 
demonization of the Muslim community, the reflexive willingness and crass thoughtlessness of 
compliance officers in schools and Universities tasked with the section 26 duty, points to its 
overwhelming failure. For example, in one case a child who could not spell and in a school essay 
wrote that he lived in a ‘terrorist’ house when in fact he meant ‘terraced’, found himself under 
investigation.  Another referral to the de radicalisation programme involved a teenage boy who was 
the subject of investigation because he was raising money for Palestinian children and wore a badge at 
his school which said “Free Palestine.” As Gearson and Rosemont (2015) suggest the “Prevent” and 
de-radicalization programme is in urgent need of reassessment. Other UK anti-terror laws, include the 
Terrorism Act 2000, which makes criminal possessing “information of a kind likely to be useful to a 
person committing or preparing an act of terrorism,” being a member of a proscribed organisation, 
and fundraising for a terrorist purpose. Section 44 of the 2000 Act also extend police powers 
permitting stop and search without suspicion which allows over surveillance of Muslim communities. 
It is now amended to include “without suspicion in a specified area where she or he reasonably 
suspects an act of terrorism is about to occur the act states in exceptional circumstances”.  
Additionally, the law post 9/11, permitted a different treatment of “the other” - the foreigner, 
and the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, exempted foreign nationals from the legal and 
human rights protections available to everyone else. This exemption of foreign nationals from laws 
protection in the UK, is also reflected in US and Canadian law and demonstrates what Saito (2009 p. 
75) calls the ‘exceptionalism’ tendency. This leads to the   lawlessness of nation states as Megret 
(2006), Bahdi (2011) Sands (2006, p. 205) Kennedy (2006) and others observe. Under the 2001 Act, 
the Secretary of State could certify foreign nationals as “detainees” and detain them without charge or 
trial on the basis that they might pose a security risk. The detention of  fourteen foreign nationals 
followed until, the House of Lords in A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department (Respondent) (2004)  ruled that indefinite detention of non UK nationals, without 
  
charge or trial was incompatible with Article 5 of the ECHR (Edwards 2008, p.  221). Baroness Hale 
in her judgment said, “235. Are foreigners and nationals alike for this purpose? The Attorney General 
argued that they are not. The foreigners have no right to be here and we would expel them if we 
could. We only have to allow them to stay to protect them from an even worse invasion of their 
human rights. Hence, he argued, the true comparison is not with suspected international terrorists who 
are British nationals but with foreign suspected international terrorists who can be deported. This 
cannot be right. The foreigners who can be deported are not like the foreigners who cannot. These 
foreigners are only being detained because they cannot be deported. They are just like a British 
national who cannot be deported. The relevant circumstances making the two cases alike for this 
purpose are the same three which constitute the problem: a suspected international terrorist, who for a 
variety of reasons cannot be successfully prosecuted, and who for a variety of reasons cannot be 
deported or expelled. [She continued] 238.  No one has the right to be an international terrorist. But 
substitute ‘black’, ‘disabled’, ‘female’, ‘gay’, or any other similar adjective for ‘foreign’ before 
‘suspected international terrorist’ and ask whether it would be justifiable to take power to lock up that 
group but not the ‘white’, ‘able-bodied’, ‘male’ or ‘straight’ suspected international terrorists. The 
answer is clear”.   The government then replied with the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 
introducing measures including “control orders” where the Secretary of State could order persons to 
be detained in their homes for initially up to 18 hours if they were considered to pose a security risk. 
Control orders were later the subject of legal challenge and replaced by TPIMS. Discussed by Mythen 
(2011 p.177) this legal measure he argues demonstrates the way in which the law is used to pre-
emptively manage what it perceives to be risk.  
 
ii. Family law, protection and rehabilitation 
Turning to the family courts their recent dealings with young people and especially young girls 
joining IS reflects a very different approach altogether. The approach is one of protection and this is 
not merely because those involved are minors but because of a different perception of how people and 
in this case young people become involved. Informed by a view that young people are groomed, 
beguiled and inveigled. The family courts have responded differently in invoking protective measures, 
including placing adolescent minors in the care of the local authority (Children Act 1989 s. 31) 
because of the risk of significant harm, or else placing them into the care of the court in the inherent 
jurisdiction of wardship. In March 2015, in London Borough of Tower Hamlets v M and Others/ In 
the matter of M (Children) [2015] the presiding judge, Mr. Justice Hayden, imposed a travel ban 
preventing five teenage girls from travelling abroad to Syria to join IS. He  imposed a travel ban in 
connection with a 16-year old boy from a family where two older brothers  had died fighting in Syria. 
He said of these two cases  
“[1] Last week, I heard two cases, both of which were brought by local authorities who were 
concerned that a number of young people, all minors in their areas, were at risk of leaving the country 
to travel to ISIS countries, particularly Syria... [3] The cases involved both girls and boys, each of 
whom was at risk, to my mind self-evidently, of significant harm in the sense contemplated by section 
31(ii) of the Children Act 1989. [4] The risk plainly differs according to gender but is nonetheless 
grave in both instances and does not need to be spelt out… [10] Thus, pursuant to this jurisdiction 
[wardship], I made orders relating to the retrieval of the passport of each of the young people 
concerned in order to use the full powers at the court's disposal to endeavour to prevent the wards 
leaving the United Kingdom”.  
Wardship has also been used to retrieve children who have already left the jurisdiction. For example, 
wardship was invoked in the case of the disappearance of the three year old Madeline McCann in 
April 2008 through what are called ‘seek and find’ orders (Welstead and Edwards 2013, p. 421).  In 
Re M (children) [2015] a family who had left the country with their four children ages ranging from 
  
20 months to 7 years of age were intercepted and returned to the UK. Sir James Munby, President of 
the Family Division said: 
“There is always, every minute of every day and night throughout the year, a judge of the Family 
Division on duty, ‘out of hours’, to deal with cases so urgent that they cannot wait. This case, I 
believe, shows the system working well. The court became involved in the early morning of Tuesday 
5 May. The children had returned to this country by the middle of the afternoon of Thursday 7 May.” 
Later that year in In the matter of M (Children) (No 2) [2015] wardship was withdrawn due to the co-
operation of the parents. 
Care proceedings have also been pursued successfully where the protection of adolescents has been 
paramount. In London Borough of Tower Hamlets v B [2015] Mr Justice Hayden, in providing the 
background to this case said, “This case comes before me consecutively with a number of other cases 
within the Borough of Tower Hamlets, each of which involves intelligent young girls, highly 
motivated academically, each of whom has, to some and greatly varying degrees, been either 
radicalised or exposed to extreme ideology promulgated by those subscribing to the values of the self-
styled Islamic State.”  
In this case he local authority sought the removal of all the children of the family, including the male 
children on the basis that: “So corrosive and insidious are the beliefs in this household, it is argued, so 
pervasive is the nature of the emotional abuse, so complete is the resistance to intervention, and so 
total the lack of co-operation, that the emotional safety of the boys, the Local Authority says, cannot 
be assured.” Care orders were granted in respect of the female and male adolescents of the household. 
 In Z (A Child), in April 2015 a young female adolescent was detained at an airport under the 
Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 after attempting to board a flight to Turkey with a single ticket. The 
terrorism unit was alerted and she was returned to her family and her passport seized. These and other 
cases resulted in Sir James Munby, President of the Family Division, on 8th October 2015 issuing 
guidance on ‘Radicalisation cases in the family courts’ in which he set out the procedures to be 
adopted in such cases to ensure not punishment but protection either through wardship or local 
authority care proceedings. The remarks of Mr Justice Hayden in the Tower Hamlets case (In the 
matter of M (Children) [2015]) above perhaps captures the objectives of the family courts which are 
distinctly different from the governments agenda. “All involved must recognise that in this particular 
process it is the interest of the individual child that is paramount. This cannot be eclipsed by wider 
considerations of counter terrorism policy or operations, but it must be recognised that the decision 
the court is being asked to take can only be arrived at against an informed understanding of that wider 
canvas.”  
 
CONCLUSION 
It is true as Orford (2007 p. 398) writes “the upheaval of 9/11 has altered international law”. It has 
also altered domestic law, Muslims find themselves over surveilled, over policed and outlawed. In the 
presence of all this vilification do these young women see themselves as part of a global resistance 
movement? And when attacked, body and soul, from all angles is it easier for the terrorist recruiter 
and groomer to inculcate women’s mind through using the platform of cyber space with an ideology 
that justifies their involvement. If the use of cyber space as a vehicle for terrorist recruitment is to be 
challenged then strategies which go beyond shutting down of chatrooms  or intercepting 
communications need to be developed these strategies lie within understanding the subjugated 
narratives responding to the sense of women’s alienation and preventing the demonization of Muslim 
communities. 
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